Who will buy India’s weapons?

1. The Ambition of Self-reliance

$

India’s weapons manufacturing push focuses on acquiring advanced technologies and encouraging local production — mostly by the private sector. The country has been moving in that direction since the Kargil War in 1999, but the pace has picked up since 2014.

At its campus in Ghaziabad, state-owned Central Electronics (CEL) sources defense technologies from DRDO, and converts them into products like missile tips (radomes). On being asked how DAP is working on the ground, a CEL official, speaking to The Polis Project on the condition of anonymity, mentioned the network analyzers (instruments used to test electrical systems) that CEL uses. “Just three or four foreign companies make these,” he said. “Earlier, we used to buy from HP, which has now spun this unit into a company called *Keysight Technologies*[https://valuetronics.com/blogs/news/understand-the-difference-between-hp-agilent-and-keysight?srsltid=AfmBOor_SmOpFow8eqpgiA1sTnKVYdXmC_WvvvRop_fX7gkOflOnleeZ].” Given import restrictions due to DAP, Keysight has tied up with a Delhi-based company called *Agmatel India*[https://www.zaubacorp.com/AGMATEL-INDIA-PRIVATE-LIMITED-U02109DL1997PTC084482], which now supplies network analyzers to CEL.

$Over the last five years, such deals have played out repeatedly across India. By March 2023, as then junior defense minister Ajay Bhatt told the parliament, the Indian government had *approved*[https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/1711/AU3911.pdf] 45 joint ventures between global manufacturers and private companies. Some of these joint ventures — like the one between Elbit and Adani — were for platforms, i.e. finished weapons or weapons systems. Others — like the one between Keysight and Agmatel — were for components. $Since then, India has seen an increase in joint ventures between local firms and global OEMs. Take firearms manufacturing, which was dominated by government factories till recently; it now has at least 12 private companies.

$Drones are much the same story. By March 2025, *India had more than 500 drone startups*[https://tracxn.com/d/explore/drones-startups-in-india/__gSDfPZkFoOxgCGVX0gqCXECXtkJ1KA1Nsoz8bS1U0Rs/companies], most of which offered dual-use (civilian and military) capabilities. So are missiles. Despite being more complex than drones or guns, the number of private firms manufacturing missiles has gone up as well. State-owned firms like BrahMos Aerospace and Bharat Dynamics now face private sector competition from firms like Adani, Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems, and Rafael Advanced Defence Systems. $Even in component manufacturing, the number of firms is rising. “In missiles, if we have 100 parts, about 25 parts were made by the private sector – by about 50-60 companies,” the senior manager at VEM Technologies said. “Today, while the number of parts made by the private sector is much the same, the number of companies making these has climbed to 100.” $India’s leading public-sector aerospace and defense manufacturing company, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), is also about to face competition from the private sector. The Indian government has *allowed private firms*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/doors-opened-to-private-sector-to-join-race-to-develop-desi-5th-gen-fighters/articleshow/121448975.cms] to bid to develop prototypes for its indigenous fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft. Tata Advanced Systems and Adani Defence are among the local business groups that have *submitted bids*[https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-fifth-generation-stealth-fighter-advanced-medium-combat-aircraft-prototype-seven-companies-bid-9376292]. $Meanwhile, the NDA government has hailed the indigenization drive as a success. “India’s defense production has grown at an extraordinary pace since the launch of the “Make in India” initiative, reaching a record Rs 1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24…”, said a *government press release*[https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2116612] in March 2025. “Once dependent on foreign suppliers, the country now stands as a rising force in indigenous manufacturing, shaping its military strength through home-grown capabilities,” it stated. $Indian defense equipment, as per *another government press release*[https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=154617&ModuleId=3], is now being shipped to nearly 100 countries. $These claims have been seconded by independent observers as well. “The government’s reforms have led to a visible improvement in defense exports,” *wrote*[https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-s-defence-industry-achievements-and-challenges] Laxman Prasad Behera, a research fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. He added, India’s defense exports have risen from Rs 4,312 crore (2004-2014) to Rs 88,319 crore (2014-24), a 21-fold decadal increase. $In tandem, as Behera noted, the share of domestic industry in high-value acquisitions is also rising. He cited 2022-23 as an instance when the MoD okayed proposals worth Rs 271,000 crore, 99% of which was meant for procurement from the domestic industry. $Are these assertions of self-reliance and rising export earnings correct? The answer lies in a broader shift in how wars are fought today.

2. Changing Warfare, Tight-fisted OEMs, Newbie Assemblers, and Elusive Exports

$ As warfare evolves beyond traditional battlefields to include multiple domains like cyberspace, outer space, and electromagnetic spectrum, and weapon technologies shift from manned to AI-driven unmanned systems, India’s defense manufacturing push faces complexity. What we found: Foreign OEMs are often reluctant to share core technologies. This reluctance leads them to partner with newcomers rather than established Indian firms, resulting in questions about the scale of localization. Additionally, while India aims to be a global weapons exporter, intellectual property restrictions raise costs and limit export potential.

2.1 How Warfare is Changing

$For the longest time, wars were purely physical, on the battlefield, albeit with ever more sophisticated weapons. Some of this had ruptured by the time of the First Gulf War (1990-91) and the Kosovo War (1998-99). Asymmetric wars with bodybags on one side and technology on the other had entered. $Since then, the nature of warfare has changed further. “The three physical domains of land, air, and sea are being replaced with seven domains — air, land, sea (undersea), outer space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and near space or hypersonic,” said defense analyst Pravin Sawhney, and author of *The Last War: How AI will Shape India’s Final Showdown with China*[https://www.alephbookcompany.com/book/the-last-war-how-ai-will-shape-indias-final-showdown-with-china/]. $In wartime, countries will increasingly face electronic attacks on national infrastructure, such as financial systems and power grids, he said. Ukraine’s *December 2015 cyber-induced grid outage*[https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Power_grid_cyberattack_in_Ukraine_(2015)], which cut power to hundreds of thousands of people, was the first such instance. $Even on the battlefield, things are changing. Weapons are evolving from manned to unmanned systems with the rising *use*[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/drones-not-diplomats-chinas-new-warfare-strategy-is-loud-fast-autonomous-and-already-war-ready/articleshow/120209778.cms] of drones (as done by Ukraine and Iran), *drone swarms*[https://www.twz.com/land/shipping-container-launcher-packing-126-kamikaze-drones-hits-the-market] (coordinated groups of drones) and loitering munitions (unmanned drones that fly to an area and hover, searching for a target to attack). Further, machine learning and AI are getting integrated in them. $“[The global weapons industry] has moved from platforms to capabilities, from hardware to software,” Sawhney told The Polis Project. “This is not [merely] about building a tank, but about trying to expand its capabilities.” $Take drones. “If an unmanned aerial vehicle has 100 components and 10 technologies, the technologies are where the most important differentiators (amongst rival weapons in the market) will lie,” said the senior manager at VEM Technologies. The technologies can include seeking software, guidance software or unmanned control. Technology has also entered areas of the weapons trade that were earlier considered relatively low-tech. *Israel’s Arbel system*[https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-india-ai-weapon-arbel-gaza-war], for instance, incorporates AI into its firearms to convert each shot to a precise kill shot, eliminating any human error. $This shift — where competitive advantage in weapons is shifting from hardware to software — is crucial for understanding how India’s ambition to become a weapons exporter is faring. Transfer of technology has long been pitched as the means to not just make India self-reliant in weaponry, but also to flip the country from a weapons buyer to a seller. $The catch is: technology is not being transferred.

2.2 The Five Costs of OEMs Not Sharing Core Technologies

$To recap, the NDA wants global OEMs to transfer weapons technology at a time battlefield competitiveness increasingly lies in code, chips, and access to “refined” information derived from battlefields — be it Israel testing its weapons on Palestinians, or the world *studying*[https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/key-questions-about-india-pakistan-aerial-clashes] the recent war between India and Pakistan to *gauge relative performance of Rafale and the Chinese J-10*[https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/how-pakistan-shot-down-indias-cutting-edge-fighter-using-chinese-gear-2025-08-02/#:~:text=The%20J-10s%20shot%20down,hardware%20against%20untested%20Chinese%20alternatives.]. What gives today’s weapons technology their competitive edge is the accumulated, refined intelligence beneath it – what theorists call “data bodies”: the aggregated informational learning from real wars and targets.

$Transfer of technology is a misnomer,” said Cowshish, explaining the key caveat in present partnerships. “No one transfers the complete know-how and know-why of state-of-the-art technologies. Why would OEMs disrupt their existing production lines and create future competition?” Even in industries like cars and electronics, Western firms have learned that technology-sharing produces new rivals. Such concerns run even deeper in the defense sector, where weapon-makers’ *valuations hinge on battlefield outcomes*[https://www.hindustantimes.com/business/rafale-maker-dassault-aviation-shares-plummet-amid-india-pakistan-tension-chinas-cac-stock-soars-101747108446631.html], which in turn depend on technological superiority. $And so, global OEMs hold these technologies close, offering them only as preloaded packages. “No firm will share its core software,” agreed H.S. Shankar, one of the founders of Bangalore-based AlphaDesign Technologies, which was acquired by Adani Defence in 2018 as the group forayed into defense manufacturing. $Foreign OEMs’ unwillingness to share core designs comes with large consequences for India’s aspiration to emerge as a global weapons exporter. $One, it leads OEMs to partner with newer local firms rather than established PSUs or private firms, because the latter will insist on technology sharing to become a part of the global supply chain. The foreign firms view them as potential competitors, and hence, are reluctant to share technology. $“Firms like Thales and Elbit should have tied up with defense PSUs or experienced private firms like Kalyani, Tata or L&T,” said defense analyst Ghazala Wahab. “That is how things worked in the past. Firms tied up with Mazgaon Dock (the state-owned shipbuilder) and then spent ten years building its capabilities.” $What we are seeing now is very different. Israel’s Elbit Systems has tied up with Adani Defence. Czech gun-maker CZ has partnered with *Vinveli India*[https://vinveli.in/commercial-firearms/], a Chennai-based firm that builds drones. Glock works through *Counter Measures Technologies*[https://www.cmtpl.com], also in Chennai. There are all new entrants in an established field. $“Firms like Tata and Kalyani will want a part of the global supply chain,” explained Wahab. “In contrast, smaller firms will only supply to the Indian armed forces. They won’t insist on a wider manufacturing role.”

"When all the key components are being imported by licensed manufacturers of firearms and simply screwdrivered in India, it delivers no substance to the idea of Make in India for defense. As on date, a majority of weapons are being produced this way. The percentage of Indigenous Content (IC) compliance is therefore rarely met and may only exist on paper. It will most likely fail the litmus test of even a rudimentary technical inspection.” - Vivek Krishnan, Founder, SSS Defence

$Two. As new entrants get into joint ventures with global OEMs, localization gets harder. If India floats a tender for a weapon which has to be, say, at least 60% indigenous in terms of final market value, bidders can either pitch locally developed weapons or present their tie-up with a foreign OEM and promise 60% localization. $There is a catch here. Since the details of local content are largely self-declared, it is hard for the government to verify claims of indigenization. On being asked if newcomers can deliver 60% localization, a senior official at Bangalore-based Axiscades Technologies, a defense firm owned by BJP leader Rajeev Chandrasekhar, said: “Firms are under-pricing imported items, and boosting margins on locally produced components, [thus] passing the product off as made-in-India.” $This point was seconded by Vivek Krishnan, the founder of Bangalore-based SSS Defence, an Indian OEM whose locally made sniper rifle *defeated*[https://theprint.in/defence/india-made-sniper-rifle-trumps-american-in-police-commando-competition/2504645/] imported rifles in the 2025 All India Police Commando Competition. “Indigenization is not just about the assembly line,” he told The Polis Project. “It includes design, building the supply chain, enshrining quality control for components, and then assembly, testing and certification. When all the key components are being imported by licensed manufacturers of firearms and simply screwdrivered in India, it delivers no substance to the idea of Make in India for defense. As on date, a majority of weapons are being produced this way. The percentage of Indigenous Content (IC) compliance is therefore rarely met and may only exist on paper. It will most likely fail the litmus test of even a rudimentary technical inspection.” $Citing drones as an instance, where indigenization is lagging, Dinesh Shivanna, the CTO of SSS Defence, added: “There is an airframe, software, autopilot, a data-link, a comms [communications] link, a camera, and an assembly. Of this, [Indian firms] only do assembly. Even the airframe’s parts are made elsewhere. But, if the mandate is for 50% localization, you will attach 50% of the value of the drone to assembly.” $Three. As global OEMs tie up with assemblers, India’s weapons manufacturing in the private sector is splitting into local OEMs and assemblers. While a few large groups like *L&T, Bharat Forge and Tata Advanced Systems*[https://www.fortuneindia.com/long-reads/indias-defence-sector-is-transforming-as-the-private-sector-storms-in-driving-modernisation/120602%23google_vignette] have been well-documented, it is still unclear what proportion of the private sector’s defense manufacturing push consists of assemblers. As the chart about firearms manufacturers shows, it is likely to be high. $“Why would the private sector invest in R&D without there being a reasonable certainty that it will be able to recover the cost and make some profit by selling the newly designed and developed product?” asked Cowshish. Assembly, in contrast, is more viable, as it is generally linked to the execution of specific contracts. $Four. Global OEMs’ unwillingness to share know-how hurts India’s defense preparedness. HAL’s Light Combat Aircraft has been *delayed*[https://thewire.in/security/engine-warfare-imported-trade-geopolitics] because General Electric’s engine deliveries were running late. $There are yet other concerns. “Look at what Israel did with the pagers,” said a senior executive in a defense PSU, on the condition of anonymity. He was referring to Israel remotely detonating explosives hidden inside pagers and walkie-talkies supplied to Hezbollah operatives across Lebanon, *killing dozens*[https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/9/17/lebanons-terrible-year-from-exploding-pagers-to-israeli-occupation] including civilians in 2024.“How do we know that anything we buy – radar, military equipment – cannot be used against us? If these are connected to the outside world, the supplier can disable at their discretion. In that case, your electronics will not work, your flights will not fly,” he said. $Apart from these, *as India’s experience with the Meteor missile shows*[https://english.mathrubhumi.com/features/specials/india-rafale-meteor-missile-delay-gevli3c0], systems from diverse countries may not be compatible. “In any meaningful defense manufacturing, we need to own the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR),” added Sudhir Mishra, former CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace. “We can take some help for design, development and production but we need the IPR. That is what [the] Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) does. It produces the IPR and then goes to the Public Sector Undertakings – be it for missiles, armaments or armour. What we are getting is licensed production.” $And finally, five. Global OEMs’ decision to tie up with assemblers comes with one more caveat: Assemblers struggle to export.

2.3 Why Exports Stay Elusive

$In 2025, the Aero Show in Bangalore drew large crowds. As in previous years, civilians walked around gawking at the fighter planes, transport carriers, and attack helicopters on display. Defense-sector insiders, however, noted more substantive differences between this defense exhibition and its predecessors. $With over 900 companies setting up stalls, it was the *biggest*[https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/biggest-ever-aero-india-to-kick-off-in-bengaluru/article69199785.ece] one to date. But the key change was that, over the preceding ten years, the ratio between foreign OEMs and local firms had flipped. In 2015, the Aero Show *had pulled in 623 companies*[https://www.vayuaerospace.in/news-details/Id/9/title/quarter-century-of-aero-india-shows]. Over half of these – 328 – were international manufacturers. By 2025, just 150 hailed from foreign countries. The rest were local firms.

$“India’s defense procurement has changed,” explained Wahab. “It’s all G2G now. Modi now goes to countries and signs deals like India’s purchase of Apaches and Chinooks from the USA as a way to bolster ties. These purchases do not see tendering. And so, fewer foreign firms are coming.” India, on the other hand, invited as many as 80 defense ministers from the Far East and Africa to the Aero Show, she added. “The idea is to get them to buy from India. We are seeing ourselves as a weapons supplier, not as a weapons buyer.”

$Such competitiveness, however, is found only with local OEMs like Kalyani Strategic Systems and SSS Defense, and not assemblers. Three reasons are at work. $One, most joint venture agreements come with *restrictions on territory and clearly forbid selling to other countries*[https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/indias-puzzled-military-industrial-complex/] and causing a conflict of interest with the original OEM. Further, Krishnan said, “It is a general policy among most countries that buy foreign defense products to insist on the country of origin and hence, only those firms that can claim to be an OEM are preferred.” $Two, even if licensing agreements allow for sales to a third country, "weapons assembled in India are costlier than those made by the foreign OEM back home,” Krishnan added. That is because, assemblers rely on foreign-made components and also have to pay a royalty on sales. $This applies to PSUs as well. A Sukhoi-30MKI assembled in India *costs Rs 100 crore more*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/after-sukhoi-mistake-india-to-go-for-russian-5th-gen-fighter-only-with-full-tech-transfer/articleshow/57546519.cms] than an off-the-shelf purchase from Russia. Given such a markup, these firms will struggle to sell indigenously assembled weapons/systems in the global market as it costs more than procuring directly from the global manufacturer. In contrast, local OEMs find it easier to compete in overseas tenders. SSS Defence, for instance, has bid for a *UK military tender*[https://chakranewz.com/critical-technologies/indian-firm-offers-rifles-to-uk-military]. $Three, as software increasingly determines weapons’ capabilities, buyers won’t buy from intermediaries without quick access to updated code. Similar constraints operate for high-tech systems — like planes and ships — which get key components from other countries. Countries will hesitate to buy the light combat aircraft, for instance, as long as HAL itself is dependent on another country for its engines. $For this reason, one chunk of India’s export earnings comes from the sales of low-tech materials like ammunition. The rest comes from local OEMs (not assemblers) selling their weapons/systems to other countries; firms like Tata Advanced Systems which ship components for weapons; and a handful of firms like Adani which work as a manufacturing center for Israeli firms. $In addition to these, India is also “classifying dual-use technologies like aeroplane wings as military sales,” said defense analyst Sushant Singh. “For this reason, *SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) data*[https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferData] on India’s *exports is entirely at variance*[https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf] with the government’s claims.” Indeed, while the Indian government pegged India’s weapons exports in 2024 at Rs 23,622 crore, up 12% from the previous year, SIPRI data shows India is not even in the top 25 weapons-exporting countries in the world. $ The Polis Project asked Rajnath Singh, India’s defense minister, and Rajesh Kumar Singh, the country’s defense secretary, to respond to all these concerns. This article will be updated when they do.

3. In the Absence of Exports, the Search for Domestic Markets

$India’s push to build a weapons-exporting industry has sparked a boom in manufacturing. But, in the absence of exports, the Indian military will be the main buyer for most firms. Given the finite number of orders the military can place, this flood of producers is experiencing a glut, with more companies and production capacity than there is demand.

3.1 As Newcomers Rush in, Overcapacity Looms

$For long, India’s weapons manufacturing sector was an enclave of engineers. It had research bodies like the DRDO; manufacturers like the ordnance factories; and their tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers, most of whom hailed from the private sector. Besides, private-sector OEMs were also growing as firms like L&T, Kalyani, Chennai-based DataPatterns, and Bangalore-based AlphaDesign Technologies established themselves. $Some of these private firms sourced *root technologies from the DRDO and operationalized them*[https://defenceupdate.in/drdo-atags-indias-very-own-indigenous-advanced-artillery-gun/]. Others, riding on their promoters’ previous work while employed by the armed forces, bootstrapped themselves. Over time, these firms too honed their capabilities. Outfits like AlphaDesign began supplying technologies, such as *missile-launch detection systems*[https://www.businesstoday.in/industry/aviation/story/alpha-signs-30-million-deal-with-elbit-for-iafs-mi17-helicopter-upgrade-71791-2017-02-16], to firms like Elbit. $Then came the transfer-of-technology approach.However, as OEMs tie up with assemblers – choosing not to share core technologies — India appears to be gaining neither self-reliance nor export-competitiveness. $Given the *promise of supernormal returns*[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-defence-sector-outlook-remains-strong-with-rising-indigenisation-and-record-orders-report/articleshow/120372227.cms?from=mdr], India’s weapons manufacturing sector is seeing a flood of neophytes. At Sarh, both Adani Defence and Aadhunik Material and Sciences are newcomers. While Adani is best known as an infrastructure concessionaire, Aadhunik’s parent company is a *road-builder*[https://arthermosets.com/]. Aadhunik forayed into *protective gear like helmets and bulletproof jackets*[https://www.ynos.in/startup/aadhunik-material-and-sciences-private-limited-421310] only *four years ago*[https://www.zaubacorp.com/AADHUNIK-MATERIAL-AND-SCIENCES-PRIVATE-LIMITED-U17299UP2021PTC144508%23google_vignette]. $“We had the mining boom, the thermal power plant boom, the PLI boom and now, we have the defense boom,” said Vishal Singh, the promoter of Navbharat Defence Systems, a Raipur-based firm planning to manufacture kamikaze drones. “A lot of companies are rushing in,” he noted. $The scale of manufacturing capacity coming up is hard to gauge. While the government announces MoUs as a measure of its success, information about actual investments is near absent. It’s hard to tell what percentage of MoUs are being converted into actual investments, according to Bharat Jain, director of New Delhi-based Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers (SIDM). Industry executives and sector observers, however, suggest the said boom is degenerating into a glut. At present, India has 15 gun-makers; *500-odd drone startups*[https://tracxn.com/d/explore/drones-startups-in-india/__gSDfPZkFoOxgCGVX0gqCXECXtkJ1KA1Nsoz8bS1U0Rs], with an unknown percentage targeting military markets; another 100 or so firms making missile components and at least five firms making missiles. $In the absence of exports, the biggest buyer is the Indian army. Can it absorb all this production? “This is the question all of us have,” said the owner of a military boots-manufacturing firm in Kanpur. “When you have a factory, you have to sell. But, if so many people set up capacities, where will they sell [their weapons]?”

$Let’s take a look at the firearms segment. In recent years, the army has been on a drive to modernize its firearms. “Its order for 750,000 rifles went to the IRRPL (Indo-Russian Rifles Pvt Ltd),” said Krishnan. “Another order — for a light machine gun — went to Adani. Since then, a third tender for 450,000 carbines (Close Quarter Battle) has been given to Bharat Forge and Adani, in a 60:40 split.” $That is three orders in a market with 15 firms. For subsequent supplies, the army will probably ask these vendors to ship more. This is partly because multiple models from different manufacturers result in un-interchangeable spare parts; and partly because the army will have to repeat its procurement process. “The Indian market is large enough for three companies making firearms,” said an observer who tracks India’s firearms manufacturing sector, on the condition of anonymity, “that is all.” $Or take ammunition for example. Adani can manufacture 150 million rounds of small-arms ammunition a year and declared *plans to double capacity*[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/adani-group-to-double-ammunition-production-capacity-amid-strong-global-demand/articleshow/118189549.cms] to 300 million rounds by the end of 2025. This, however, is a crowded field. $Not only do estimates of India’s annual requirement of small calibre ammunition range widely – ranging from KPMG’s *158 million rounds*[https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2024/08/ammo-india-2024-make-in-india-make-for-the-world.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf] estimate to Adani Defence’s *600 million rounds*[https://theprint.in/defence/from-unmanned-naval-systems-to-artillery-guns-here-are-adani-groups-focus-areas-in-defence-sector/1981997/] – India now has multiple firms making ammunition. For instance, Munitions India (and sister firm Yantra India) already *make 300 million rounds*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/nato-country-places-order-for-5-56mm-bullets-with-yil-mil/articleshow/89783406.cms] a year and *Hughes Precision was boosting its production to 220 million rounds*[https://www.hughesprecisionm.com] by the end of 2025. Can all the surplus production be exported? If not, how much can the Indian armed forces buy? $This pattern transcends categories. From how many companies can India’s armed forces buy drones, unmanned underwater vehicles, ammunition, missiles, or fighter planes? $“You cannot have many players vying for a share of the same pie,” said Cowshish. “Competition works in [industries like] the auto sector,” he said. “But the government cannot be influenced into buying different kinds of tanks, fighter aircraft, or assault rifles only to sustain the companies which manufacture them.” $When only the public sector firms made weapons, this was not a problem. “Set up to fulfill a mandate for the armed forces, they had a captive customer and a fair visibility of the demand,” Cowshish said. “It’s a challenge for the private sector to generate the demand it needs to sustain itself commercially.” $The Kanpur-based businessman’s footwear firm survives by using its assembly line to make both military and industrial shoes. However, unlike boots or drones, most weapons can only be sold to armed forces. $On its own, overcapacity is not a problem. All it portends is a future shakeout to balance demand and supply. What makes this moment messy, however, is the profile of some of the new entrants. As with India’s previous boom-and-bust cycles, influential promoters and large conglomerates are skewing the playing field against more legitimate startups.

3.2 Role of Political Connections

$“Till DAP, we had middlemen bringing weapons into the country and trying to get orders,” said the firearms sector observer. “What has happened now is: the dalals have become pseudo-manufacturers.” $Take Sushen Mohan Gupta, one of India’s biggest defense middlemen. He *signed defense deals*[https://caravanmagazine.in/reportage/gupta-papers-rafale-deal-agusta-westland-sushen-gupta] worth Rs 83,300 crore during the Congress-led UPA years and another Rs 98,400 crore under the BJP-led NDA. His 2023 profile in Caravan magazine contains a telling detail: he wanted offsets from Dassault Aviation. $Several firms also have political and bureaucratic links. Some of these connections — like those between promoters like Rajeev Chandrasekhar and the Bharatiya Janata Party — are well-known. $ The Polis Project found that some smaller firms, too, have political links. $In one case, a firm making defense electronics appears to share directors and ownership links with a company accused of serious customs violations, while maintaining connections to the ruling political party. Chennai-based *Jeanuvs*[https://www.zaubacorp.com/FLDEC-DEFENCE-SPACE-AND-SECURITY-PRIVATE-LIMITED-U29309TN2021PTC141482] (now known as FLDEC Systems), incorporated in 2021, provides electronic and mechanical engineering systems to the defense sector. It owned a controlling stake in Vidvedaa PRG Airport Retail TRZ, a firm *accused by Indian Customs*[https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/chennai/2024/Jul/02/aai-top-official-in-chennai-under-lens-in-267-kg-gold-smuggling-case] of being a front for a Sri Lankan gold smuggling syndicate. Jeanuvs’ founder, Vanchinathan Thangavel, was a *director on Vidvedaa PRG Airport Retail*[https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67b49b9cbde90d186f23ad15] along with *Gavarapet Ashok Prithvi*[https://www.zaubacorp.com/GAVARAPET-ASHOK-PRITHVI-07026840], a former state executive member of the Tamil Nadu BJP Youth Wing. Prithvi, as the News Minute reported, was also Vidvedaa PRG Airport Retail’s managing director. The Polis Project wrote to Thangavel asking him about this political link. This article will be updated when he responds.

$Raipur-based Navbharat Defence Systems’ Vishal Singh is the son of a former BJP organization secretary in Chhattisgarh. Jayaswal Neco, *which plans to make sniper and assault rifles*[https://necodefence.com/about/], has been accused in the past of *using proximity to political power to bag coal blocks*[https://www.livemint.com/Politics/1XLKrsNKMztWUOmgjQ9CKN/The-man-who-fell-to-earth.html] during India’s captive coal block allocations. $Another firearms manufacturer, ICOMM Tele, is owned by *Megha Engineering and Infrastructures (MEIL)*[https://meil.in/icomm-caracal-set-arms-facility-hyderabad], which made headlines in 2024 for its *large political donations through electoral bonds*[https://indianexpress.com/article/business/donor-no-2-megha-bought-poll-bonds-even-as-it-got-key-govt-psu-contracts-9242529/]. The Indian Express report shows that MEIL received large infrastructure project contracts from the government “either just before or immediately after” purchasing the bonds. $In the case of Counter Measures Technologies (CMPTL), the Indian partner of Glock pistols, its promoter *Jayakumar Jayarajan*[https://www.theindustryoutlook.com/manufacturing/vendor/counter-measures-technologies-experts-in-manufacturing-proof-testing-of-firearms-ammunition-cid-5329.html%23google_vignette]’s sister and her spouse are both serving civil servants (IAS officers) in Uttar Pradesh. While CMPTL didn’t respond to The Polis Project’s questions, one of the two bureaucrats did, saying, “We have no idea what is happening in that company. We do not have even 1% connection with that company.” $While there cannot be a presumption of wrongdoing just because a firm is related to a senior bureaucrat or politician, India’s systems for monitoring undue favour or patent irregularity — tendering, audit, and vigilance — are weak as well. “The tendering process should be reviewed and audited concurrently and not years after the contract is awarded,” said Cowshish. “Its focus continues to be on punishing transgressions and not on preventing them by identifying the loopholes in the procurement process and taking quick preventive measures.” $Much of this, he said, was sought to be codified in *the Public Procurement Bill 2012*[https://sps.iitd.ac.in/PDF/PPB.pdf], but it was never enacted. The bill defined penalties for anyone seeking to influence the procurement process, and provided for a ten-day holding period before any contract is awarded. That was for bidders or prospective bidders aggrieved by any decision or action of the procuring entity to seek a review. For reviews, independent procurement redressal committees were to be set up. To curb abuse of the ‘holding period’ clause, the bill also spelled out penalties for vexatious complaints. $The bill, however, was referred to a select committee in 2012, where it lapsed. In 2015, the NDA *promised*[https://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/nda-set-to-revive-upas-public-procurement-bill/] to revive it, but nothing has happened since.

"Not having such measures means there remains room for vested interests to push military hardware into the central and state armed forces. “As we now know, technological capacity has little to do with the final agreement. That is a lot more about other considerations like who you know in the system and what your affiliations are"

— Rahul Bedi, defense analyst

$The upshot? Even as India’s weapons manufacturing sector bloats into overcapacity, the entry of influential actors is further queering the field. With their entry, every player — local OEMs, large business groups, PSUs, politically-connected newcomers, and defense startups — are fashioning their own response to overcapacity. The foremost among them is Adani.

3.3 What Adani is Doing: Defense Manufacturing and International Military Networks

$The Adani Group’s defense business has rapidly expanded through numerous joint ventures with international firms from countries like Israel, the UAE, France, the USA, Italy, and Bulgaria, alongside strategic acquisitions to grow its capabilities. This expansion positions Adani as a key player in India’s defense industry, intensifying competition with state-owned enterprises while focusing on both domestic and export markets. Central to this growth is Adani’s close collaboration with Israel’s military-industrial complex, alongside India’s growing diplomatic relations with the country, and manufacturing base to advance shared defense technologies and strategic interests, with Adani replicating Israel’s own arms-export model. As these Indian companies deeply embed themselves in the global weapons supply chain, some critics have *raised*[https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/india-is-firing-the-engine-of-war-in-gaza-while-preaching-peace-3084659] questions about the political and ethical implications of such companies’ expanding roles, particularly regarding controversial regimes, and the broader impact on regional security dynamics. $For all its size, the ammunition complex outside Sarh is a fraction of the Adani Group’s weapons-making ambition. Founded just ten years ago, it now offers a wide range of defense products: *UAVs*[https://www.adanidefence.com/unmanned-systems] (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), *counter-drone systems*[https://www.adanidefence.com/counter-drone-systems], small arms, missiles, aircraft maintenance, *guns*[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/adani-unveils-south-asias-largest-defence-complex-in-kanpur-to-add-4000-jobs/articleshow/108012504.cms?from=mdr], and shipbuilding . It was on track to making fighter planes along with Saab, before the *Swedish firm peeled away*[https://www.hindustantimes.com/business/mutual-decision-defence-firm-saab-on-parting-ways-with-adani-group-101675962430080.html]. $As of writing, Adani has partnerships with at least seven defense companies from Israel, and one apiece from the UAE, Italy, France, the USA, Bulgaria, and India.

$In February 2024, during the war in Gaza, Adani Group-owned news portal NDTV *reported*[https://www.ndtv.com/business-news/in-a-first-india-delivers-made-in-hyderabad-hermes-drones-to-israel-5024597] the delivery of 20 Hermes 900 drones to Israel, citing Shepherds Media. It said: “The Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India Ltd, based in Hyderabad, has become the first entity outside of Israel to manufacture the Hermes 900. This joint venture between India's Adani Defence and Aerospace and Israel's Elbit Systems underscores the collaborative efforts between the two nations in advancing defence technology.” Israel has reportedly deployed the Hermes 900 in both *Gaza*[https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-on-gaza-indian-made-israel-killer-hermes-drone-make-way] and *Iran*[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2025-06-23/ty-article/.premium/four-israeli-drones-downed-two-by-iran-two-shot-down-by-idf-u-s-forces/00000197-9c2d-db6f-a9ff-bf7d739c0000] (during the 2025 attack). $*As in the past*[https://thewire.in/business/adanis-acquisitions-the-inorganic-strategy-behind-the-purchase-of-gangavaram-port], the group has also used acquisitions to grow rapidly. In 2018, Adani deepened its *2016 alliance*[https://www.livemint.com/Companies/DCpFevRz6Oo88qLURHKvjL/Adani-ties-up-with-Elbit-Alpha-for-unmanned-aircraft-system.html] with Israel’s Elbit Systems by acquiring *AlphaDesign*[https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/adani-enterprises-arm-acquires-alpha-design-technologies/article26899360.ece], which was already working with Elbit. The next year, it tied up with gunmaker Israel Weapon Industries by *acquiring Punj Lloyd’s PLR Systems*[https://caravanmagazine.in/government/india-enabled-israel-genocide-gaza] once the parent firm slipped into bankruptcy courts. In 2024, it entered the aircraft maintenance, repair and operations business by buying India’s *Air Works (Engineering)*[https://airworks.aero/media-center/press-release/air-works-signs-binding-share-purchase-agreement-with-adani-defence-aerospace]. Incidentally, Punj Lloyd was a shareholder in Air Works as well. $Riding on acquisitions and joint ventures, the group’s production is growing steeply. One part of its sales, according to a defense PSU union leader in Kanpur, is at the cost of state-owned entities. Adani is pulling orders from government-owned Advanced Weapons and Equipment India (AWEIL), claimed a union leader at an ordinance factory in Kanpur. The latter’s orders are slipping away. “Adani ko load shift ho raha hain (Our orders are shifting to Adani),” he said on the condition of anonymity. “Our company has 54% overheads — labour, research, and so on — and so, it is hard for us to be L1 (the lowest bidder).” $Apart from domestic sales, Adani is doubling down on exports. Here, its joint ventures with Israel’s military-industrial complex play a central role. $Take Arbel. According to *The Middle East Eye*[https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-india-ai-weapon-arbel-gaza-war], Arbel was originally unveiled as a “co-venture” between Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI) and Adani Defence & Aerospace. “While it’s unclear what role each company played in the production of Arbel, it is likely that IWI and Adani were jointly involved in manufacturing the components with the electronics and the AI system, and the assembly of the product most likely taking place in Israel,” it wrote. $And yet, Adani, *a Haaretz report*[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-04-19/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/why-the-future-of-israeli-defense-lies-in-india/00000196-4c0a-dd47-ad9f-cedba2eb0000] shows, is just one Indian conglomerate who has tied up with Israel’s military-industrial complex. There are *several others*[https://elplaw.in/leadership/india-israel-strategic-collaborations-in-the-defence-industry-2/]. $As Indian conglomerates tie up with Israeli weapons manufacturers, India risks becoming a channel for Israeli arms reaching countries reluctant to buy from Israel directly. It could become a node through which Israel sources components from third countries. $In the ranks of weapon-manufacturing nations, Israel stands out. To keep its arms industry feasible, as journalist Azad Essa writes in *Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance between India and Israel*[https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745345017/hostile-homelands/], Israel exports both hardware and expertise. “Not only did the exports lower the cost of manufacturing weapons for the Israeli army, they also created thousands of jobs and helped propel Israel towards becoming a military superpower,” he writes. The exports increased production, thereby boosting economies of scale. $For this reason, Israel ignored diplomatic restrictions, like trade and arms embargoes, and sold weapons to apartheid South Africa. Israel began *supplying weapons to India*[https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/planes-drones-missiles-kargil-indo-israeli-relations] from the time of the Kargil war, when India bought UAVs and ammunition from the country. Thereafter, India’s defense procurement from Israel has only grown. $To not lose out on weapon sales to India when it announced import restrictions, Israel was one of the first countries to embrace offsets. “A survey posted on the Indian defense ministry website indicates that out of 56 offset deals since 2005, 23 (41%) are with Israeli companies — more than the US or all European countries,” *reported Haaretz*[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-04-19/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/why-the-future-of-israeli-defense-lies-in-india/00000196-4c0a-dd47-ad9f-cedba2eb0000]. As for India, it has become Israel’s biggest defense customer — *accounting for 42% of its total sales between 2015 and 2021*[https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-israel-arms-trade-numbers]. $Fear of losing sales, however, was not the only reason Israel embraced offsets. “Since the 1970s, Israel has served as a testing ground for new American military technologies, and occasionally as an avenue for deals that Washington preferred to distance itself from,” said the Haaretz report. That structure is now reproducing itself between Israel and India. In other words, Israel can now use India to sell weapons to countries that might not want to publicly buy from it. $The US and Israel are trying to push China and Russia out of weapon markets in Africa, Latin America and East Europe,” said Singh, the defense analyst. “This makes sense for the USA because they want to stymie China everywhere,” he added. $In tandem, as Lowenstein writes in *The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technologies of Occupation Around the World*[https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/2684-the-palestine-laboratory?srsltid=AfmBOopKjTNeOSBxOKPyw34ME4JDef1WD3F6sAC4dcQZbhovRvEtYkL4], “The Israeli defense sector is… becoming much less public.” He quotes Israeli human rights lawyer Eitay Mack as saying: “In the coming years, I do not see police in Bahrain using Israeli rifles or Israeli drones or missiles being bought by the United Arab Emirates because it could cause another Cuban missile crisis type situation and inflame Iran.” Amid this, India, with its positive diplomatic relations with most countries, serves as a good base for production. As Vishal Singh said when we met in Raipur: “India is now friends with all. Which means we can sell weapons to all.” $So, where global OEMs hold their core technologies close, Israeli firms have been sharing their technologies with India. “*Israel Aerospace Industries*[https://drdo.gov.in/drdo/sites/default/files/newsletter-document/DRDO_NL_Oct_2021.pdf] (IAI) did this earlier with DRDO – spinning that JV as one for joint research and development of missiles,” said Wahab, talking about its Medium Range-Surface to Air Missiles. “The missiles, however, came to India as CKDs.” CKDs, or Completely Knocked Down kits, are assembled locally. $Israel is also using Indian partners to source military components, says a report called ‘*Short-Circuiting International Law*[https://www.somo.nl/short-circuiting-international-law/]’ by SOMO, an Amsterdam-based think tank that monitors multinational corporations. It focuses on a Bangalore-based firm called SASMOS HET Technologies. Electronic components used for military planes and vehicles are shipped to this firm by Dutch businessmen, says SOMO. SASMOS then integrates these into sub-assemblies like radios for drones and displays for fighter jet cockpits and ships them to Israel. $ The Polis Project wrote to SASMOS asking it to comment. This article will be updated when it responds. $The footprint of these joint ventures needs further discussion. Not only are Indian firms becoming a cog in the military bloc of Israel and the USA, they are developing the same capabilities as Israel’s military-industrial complex. These are described as “occupation expertise” by Lowenstein in The Palestine Laboratory, or how Israel uses surveillance and weapons to keep Palestinians in check. India’s military requirements, however, are very different.

3.4 Smaller Firms Looking for New Markets within India

$If firms like Adani Defence with Israeli tie-ups are eyeing domestic sales and exports, where do the rest sell? The PSUs are struggling, as the union leader said. Smaller private companies are struggling too. “I see many firms winding down,” said the Kanpur-based businessman. “How many is the million-dollar question.” $Firms are also reaching out to India’s paramilitary forces and, in the footsteps of the surveillance industry, state police. “Our market is state police departments, the Ministry of Home Affairs (NSG, CISF, ITBP, CRPF) and the MoD (army, navy, airforce),” an executive at the Vinveli office in Chennai told The Polis Project.

“Defense is a business which needs investment and assurance. Any investment you make, you need to know that assembly here will be viable. Firms have to be either sure they can sell to the Indian defense forces; be a part of global supply chains; or have some other way of knowing they can offload stocks.”

— A senior manager at VEM Technologies

$Vinveli is not the only one vying for a bigger market. Chetan Seth, the Chairman of Chemon Group, which manufactures 40mm multi grenade launchers with Rippel Effect of South Africa, said, “Once the army chooses a weapon, it tends to place subsequent orders with the same company.” He added, “If I miss that order, we have the modernization of the paramilitaries. The state police forces are a huge and growing market too.” $Uttar Pradesh police, for instance, *ordered 1,228 units of the CZ Scorpion Evo 3 A1 submachine gun*[https://defence.in/threads/up-ats-chooses-vinvelis-cz-scorpion-evo-over-indigenous-asmi-for-1-228-smg-tender.10754/] from Vinveli. A serious question lies here. Unlike the army, police forces engage with India’s civilian population. Why would they need a gun capable of spraying *1,150 rounds per minute*[https://publish.obsidian.md/cynixia/Scorpion+EVO+3]? $On being posed that question, Rajnish Sharma, an *army colonel who now heads Chhattisgarh’s anti-Maoist Special Task Force*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/now-stf-headed-by-col-to-combat-terror/articleshow/2341623.cms] at his unit headquarters outside the town of Durg, bristled. “Which of these weapons would (the) police not need?” he asked. “Which parts of this country are free from terrorism? There is urban warfare. In the case of something like Batla House, you will need LMGs and sniper rifles for a siege. A sniper rifle for precision shooting. SMG or 9 mm calibre guns for room entry, and also hand grenades and stun grenades.” $Hardwired into his assertion is another large change playing out in India.

3.5 Hypermilitarization in India

$Both Central Armed Police Forces (paramilitary forces like Assam Rifles, Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force) and state police are bulking up their armories. “Upgradation has been taking place for a while,” said a senior official who has worked in the National Security Advisor’s (NSA) office. “A lot of military grade weaponry is entering the paramilitaries and, from there, reaching the state police as well. This has always been the case. Weapons come into the military and then find their way into the state police.” $Both Sharma and the official who has worked in the NSA’s office described this build-up as unavoidable. “Terrorism is omnipresent,” claimed Sharma. “In Batla House, the terrorists had AK47s. To counter, you need something better. Across India, all goons are using AK47s. In Punjab, drug smugglers carry not just AK47s but also M16s. In the recent terror attack at Kathua, they had carried M4s.” $This is the logic of homeland security. Between the parliament attack and 26/11, the chorus for boosting domestic security has gotten louder. India, writes Manisha Sethi in *Kafkaland: Prejudice, Law and Counterterrorism in India*[https://www.threeessays.com/product/kafkaland-prejudice-law-and-counterterrorism-in-india/], has become a “techno-security state”, one that was being “advocated feverishly by an elastic group of corporates, ex-army generals, technocrats, arms traders, think tanks, security experts, commentators — and it was difficult mostly to tell one from another.” $One fallout of all this? Indian paramilitaries are baulking at hand-me-downs from the army and states are creating special police forces. Andhra Pradesh started with the Greyhounds. Chhattisgarh followed with squads like the Special Task Force and the District Reserve Guards. CRPF created COBRA. Each of these units has infantry weapons like automatic firearms. $“When you have a special problem, like terrorism in Punjab or Naxalism [Maoism] in central India, you need a specialized unit to tackle it,” said R.K. Vij, a former Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh. “We need such forces because regular police forces cannot handle such tasks.” Citing Maoism, he added, “Law and order comes under the state police. What happened in Chhattisgarh is we didn’t have enough troops. Therefore, central troops were needed. But then, you are dependent on them and you have to pay for them. It is also important we have these troops because if we ask the army to come, it will do so with its own weapons–AK47s or something higher.” $And yet, states unaffected by Maoism are bulking up on weapons too. The Uttar Pradesh Special Security Force was set up in 2020 to protect the courts, major religious places and establishments of the state. In 2024 the BJP-led state government said it would spend Rs 23 crore to procure *465 automatic pistols, 1113 submachine guns, and 330 assault rifles*[https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/lucknow-news/upssf-to-be-equipped-with-state-of-the-art-weapons-101710788577013.html], among other weapons, for the force. Since then, it has placed more orders. “The state police force will soon be equipped with combat shotguns, 9 mm pistols, 5.56 mm rifle carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, pump action guns, and advanced auxiliary gadgets such as thermal weapon sight for sniper rifles, magazines for Glock 33 pistols and huge cache of ammunitions for practice as well as for field operations,” reported *Hindustan Times*[https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/lucknow-news/up-police-armoury-to-gain-rs-83-crore-firepower-101743533146367.html] last April. $Uttar Pradesh is not an outlier. Other states have set up special forces as well – like Delhi Police’s SWAT or Mumbai Police’s QRT and Force One – and heavily armed them. State police in Manipur have *medium machine guns*[https://m.thewire.in/article/security/manipur-police-gets-medium-machine-guns-seeks-army-training]. Their counterparts in other places like *Madhya Pradesh*[https://www.abplive.com/states/madhya-pradesh/mp-police-to-receive-upgraded-weapons-soon-as-government-looking-to-reform-ann-2118205] and *Jammu and Kashmir*[https://www.wionews.com/india-news/for-first-time-in-india-jk-police-to-get-american-assault-rifles-and-pistols-442976] have bulked up their arsenals too. $With this, said the NSA official, “The gap between the armed police and armed forces is narrowing.” And what India is getting, like the USA, is a *hypermilitarized police*[https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/papers/gpj/militarisation_of_the_indian_police.pdf]. “If you go to a police station, you will find an armoury which will look like a small arms base,” he said. $As private sector weapon manufacturers try to cash in on this homeland security boom, another set of dire implications is taking shape.

4. The Business and Cost of Hypermilitarization

$ India’s current anti-Maoist campaign in Bastar signals a deepening militarization of internal security, as state forces deploy military-grade weapons, drones, and heavy artillery with escalating civilian risks. This hardening is mirrored across India, where police and paramilitary units, equipped with increasingly advanced and excessive weaponry, blur the lines between civil policing and military operations. As procurement grows, often without clear oversight or justification, the dangers of indiscriminate force, misuse, and systemic corruption intensify, fostering a hypermilitarized security culture and raising questions about accountability, proportionality, and the long-term impact on democratic norms.

4.1 The View from Bastar

$As this article was being written, India’s offensive against the Maoist insurgency entered what Indian media has been describing as a “*decisive phase*[https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/ground-zero-bastar-the-fight-to-finish-off-maoists-2648870-2024-12-12]”. $Last April, the CRPF and Chhattisgarh’s Special Task Force (STF) and District Reserve Guards attacked a Maoist stronghold — the Karregutta hills at the border between Chhattisgarh and Telangana — and, *at the end of three weeks*[https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128736], took it over. The next month, state forces killed top Maoist leader Nambala Keshav Rao (65), a general secretary of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). $Later, on November 18, 2024, Maoist leader Madvi Hidma (50), his wife Madakam Raje (44) and four other Maoist rebels were *killed*[https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/top-maoist-hidma-killed-in-crippling-blow-to-lwe-101763491488535.html] by the Andhra Pradesh state police. Over the past year, *335 Maoists were killed*[https://scroll.in/latest/1089376/335-left-wing-extremists-killed-in-2025-over-2100-surrendered-centre] in this region and over 2,000 surrendered, according to official estimates. $his round of anti-Maoist operations differed from what India had conducted even five or ten years ago. There was, for one, far greater use of military weaponry, including, as journalist Malini Subramaniam reported, *helicopters, heavy artillery, and possibly even missiles*[https://scroll.in/article/1081780/as-maoists-ask-for-ceasefire-security-forces-shell-hills-sheltering-top-insurgent-leaders]. $“We Indians only do proportionate response which, in fact, prolongs conflict scenarios into protracted wars,” said Rajnish Sharma, who heads Chhattisgarh’s STF. “LWE [Left Wing Extremism] in India is one example. We could have eradicated it long back had we gone all out with all dimensions of combat protocols 25 years back. Chhattisgarh would have not endured so much loss of Security Forces’ lives.” $Speaking about the current counter-insurgency operations, Sharma said, “Since April 2025, we have been going all out — attack helicopters, 81 mm mortars, preponderance of ground forces, fleet of choppers for full logistic supplies — the end result was [that] the naxal cadre lost their will to fight and hence the mass surrenders [took place].” $With that, however, the risk of non-combatants being killed rose as well. For instance, in Bijapur, the People’s Union of Civil Liberties found, *mortar shells had killed two adivasi boys*[https://maktoobmedia.com/features/chhattisgarh-pucl-blames-govt-forces-mortar-shell-for-killing-two-adivasi-boys-in-may/]. $“Villages in Bastar say they are getting a lot of shelling,” Subramaniam told The Polis Project. “CRPF says it is using 51 mm shells. But the bomb fragments we see here are 81 mm shells.” $The difference is material. 51 mm mortar shells have a range of 850 meters, a kill radius of 3 meters, and a danger zone of 5 meters. But the 81 mm shell has "a range of 5 km, a kill radius of 5 meters, and a danger zone of 200 meters,” as an officer at the Chhattisgarh STF’s headquarter outside Bilaspur told The Polis Project. “That is how far the shrapnel can fly if the mortar lands on a hard surface like a rock.” $State forces were also using drones for surveillance and chasing villagers, Subramaniam added. “The people are chased such that they run into the forces which are stationed nearby,” she said. “There are 4-5 cases where drones have even been used to drop bombs.” $A Chhattisgarh Police source corroborated her claim. “No one will confirm this,” he said on the condition of anonymity. “But yes, it happened. The CRPF dropped grenades on Maoists. At that time, the state government had protested.” $On being asked why there was opposition, he said: “If you get it wrong, civilians will die. Army intelligence is not foolproof. And so, some of this can become indiscriminate. These [drones] are used in border areas as a military weapon. The mortar shells are the same story. ”

4.2 The War Beyond Bastar

$Bastar, however, is just the start of a new era of hypermilitarized responses to local issues. In September 2025, firearms used by Ladakh police and CRPF to crack down on unarmed protestors were *powerful enough to kill four and leave others with exit wounds*[https://thewire.in/rights/ladakh-leh-protest-sonam-wangchuk-rights-security-forces-firing]. Here’s what happened to a teenage protestor: “A bullet chipped away a part of his fibula as it travelled though his limb before exiting,” reported The Wire. $“I can imagine a situation in which the police need a submachine gun or a pump action shotgun,” said Vij. “But you cannot have an assault rifle for policing.” $For crowd dispersal, police usually use shotguns, loaded with rounds of pellets, rubber, or slugs. Submachine guns may be needed for close-range shooting. Assault rifles, however, come with a range of 300-500 meters, which makes them suitable for infantry warfare, not policing. $While such acquisitions are deemed unavoidable by national security hawks, questions need to be asked. Does Uttar Pradesh need a special police force to guard its courts, temples, and administrative buildings? “The country’s VIPs now get the level of security once given to world leaders,” said the previously quoted NSA official. “The level of protection once given to a head of state is now being given to a halfpenny-tuppeny politician. This is now a status symbol.” $Going by media reports, Uttar Pradesh also wanted to *issue Glocks to home guards*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/up-home-guards-to-be-armed-with-glock-pistols/articleshow/91188593.cms]. Home guards, however, are meant to help police forces in emergencies with traffic management and so on. As V.N. Rai, a retired Director General of Police from Haryana, told The Polis Project: “They are called out in support roles and normally don't need firearms.” $Considering the volume and nature of the weapons being brought, one must assess whether the government-identified threat matches the procurement. For example, the Indian government cites internal security to justify its *crackdown*[https://thepolisproject.com/read/pushed-back-india-new-deportation-regime-bangladesh/] on suspected illegal Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingya refugees. “There is not a single FIR against the Rohingyas,” said Rai. “So what is the threat? But, in their name, weapons are being bought.” $Speaking on police modernization, Rai said, “In the Indian context, police modernization has come to mean militarization,” adding that the police don’t need such weapons, and definitely not in the numbers being bought. “A civil police force might need 1,000 lathis [batons]. It might need a few units of tear gas. But why do you need 1,000 rifles for 1,000 policemen? You are not going to fire at your civilians. Even in a situation, a whole battalion is not sent. We might send a platoon, a section, or a company. If a battalion has 20 rifles, that is more than enough to crush any situation.” $It should be asked, Rai noted, how many of the purchased weapons have been used. “From what I see, 95% have never been used. But if you don’t spend, how do you get your commission? That is what is happening here.” $“To modernize the police, we have to reduce militarization,” he added. “If I come in front of you with an assault rifle, will you feel safe or frightened? Big weapons result in neither security nor trust. The Indian police need trust-oriented training. The relationship between people and the police has to change.” $Between India’s uncritical embrace of the homeland security path and private weapon manufacturers looking for sales, the country is seeing the rise of a new gravy train. “In the past, we never procured from private companies,” Vij said. “Most of our weapons were bought from defense PSUs like the ordnance factory at Trichy. That is changing now.” $As India develops its own privately owned military-industrial complex, a political economy similar to the global weapons market is emerging for domestic sales. It, too, has built-in secrecy and high-value deals, which make bribes possible; technical complexity makes it easy to hide payments and corrupt motivations in selections. It makes room for cutthroat competition between suppliers, and a nexus between politicians and firms. $“All companies in this trade have some political or bureaucratic connection,” said Sharma, Chhattisgarh STF head. “Some vendors want to sell something we do not need. One firm tried to sell us *cornershots*[https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/corner-shot-weapon-system] (weapons used to shoot around corners). But that is something the NSG [National Security Guard] needs, not us.” $There is also concern around under-selling, where products with weaker capabilities (or poorer quality) might be foisted on troops. “Everything made for the army has to meet standards,” said the owner of the military boots-manufacturing firm in Kanpur. “The first pair you make should be the same as the hundredth and the thousandth pair. The importance of this cannot be overstressed.” $Stringent testing, said Sharma, prevents both over- and under-selling. Even if that is true for the Special Task Force in Chhattisgarh, it need not be for the rest of India. $In the case of Madhya Pradesh, the state government had bought *2,700 imported pump action shotguns*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhopal/700-pump-action-rifles-of-mp-forest-dept-to-bolster-bsf-at-bdesh-border/articleshow/113333282.cms] for its forest department. These guns’ range is low compared to poachers’ high-powered rifles, but it would be overkill if the department is engaging with local protesters. These were later discontinued due to conflict with the police force. $While these purchases are shrouded in opacity, the aftereffects are not. “Once a police force has weapons, use-cases emerge,” said the NSA official. That is what happened in Thoothukudi, where *the police used self-loading rifles*[https://www.thenewsminute.com/tamil-nadu/thoothukudi-snipers-not-only-violated-rules-tampered-evidence-commission-report-169042] on villagers protesting against Sterlite. Thirteen people died. $India’s police forces have been repeatedly complicit in atrocities. In the northeastern state of Manipur, the state police have been *plagued by ethnic divides*[https://theprint.in/india/in-manipur-its-kuki-vs-meitei-cops-how-unrest-exposed-ethnic-faultlines-within-state-police/1650205/] in recent conflict, and they have also been implicated in extra-judicial killings in the past. Between January 1979 and May 2012, Manipur saw 1,528 fake encounters by security forces, according to a memorandum submitted by civil society groups in Manipur to Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary executions, states. Of these, Assam Rifles had *reportedly*[https://scroll.in/article/732113/why-children-in-manipur-are-writing-postcards-to-prime-minister-narendra-modi] killed 419 people; joint teams of state police and central paramilitary forces were responsible for another 481; and the state’s police and commandos had killed another 377 people. Manipur remains under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act that grants sweeping powers, but the impunity under it doesn't extend to forces mentioned above. $And yet, the police forces have medium machine guns. Their light machine guns were earlier *stolen*[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/manipur-police-seeks-army-help-for-mmg-training/articleshow/113076366.cms] by rioters during the Manipur conflict. $Manipur is far from an exception. “Our police have been developed on the lines of an infantry battalion,” Rai said. “It has the same discipline, it is trained to respect superiors, not civilians.” $Author and academic Manisha Sethi concurred with Rai. “Indian police remains one of the most prejudiced police forces in the world,” she said. “A study conducted by Common Cause found nearly 50% of police personnel felt that Muslims were very much or somewhat naturally prone towards committing crimes.” $Compounding the matter, police forces across India are overworked yet poorly trained. By 2018, even as the state of Uttar Pradesh *began handing pistols*[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-45719940] instead of the usual rifle to constables, the time spent on police training had decreased. As a result, poorly-trained cadets entered the police force but were handed weapons; the state saw a spike in extrajudicial “encounter” killings. $Even this, however, is not the full litany of the costs India will incur by liberalizing weapons manufacturing. Between promoters’ political links and firms’ imperative to sell, there is also the danger that surplus weapons will find their way into the civilian market. Counter Measure Technologies, for instance, *wants to sell*[https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/make-in-india-in-a-first-citizens-will-buy-glock-pistols-armed-forces-use/story-Hp0SI7DwIC14FsZXb4fIPI.html] Glocks to civilians. This development comes even as the country sees a steady rise in hate messaging and crime, politically aligned vigilante squads, and unemployment. $The spectre of weapons reaching civilians and non-state actors extends beyond firearms. In the Manipur conflict, *drones have been used to drop bombs*[https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/banned-insurgent-group-releases-video-claiming-drone-attack-on-assam-rifles-camp/article70393519.ece/amp/]. Or take undersea unmanned vehicles: “We saw a model which was offering 45-day endurance,” said the head of an Indian weapons OEM, on the condition of anonymity. “Can you imagine the possibilities for gold smugglers and others?”

5. The Permanent War Economy

$India’s rapid expansion of defense manufacturing is creating a permanent war economy, with private firms flooding the space in pursuit of lucrative contracts and state support. This shift echoes earlier sectors’ oligarchic consolidation, risking overcapacity and weakening oversight. Instead of fostering indigenous innovation or the sustainable transfer of technology, the current trajectory cultivates a powerful, privately owned military-industrial complex, one that accelerates the militarization of both state forces and society, heightening vulnerabilities in an era marked by social division and economic precarity.

5.1 Conclusion

$On the whole, a familiar arc is retracing itself. $In 2006, India liberalized power generation, opening what had been the preserve of state-owned firms to the private sector. Eyeing high returns, neophytes from unrelated sectors such as media, politics, textiles, and construction gambolled into power generation. The *aftermath*[https://thewire.in/political-economy/crony-capitalism-on-modis-watch-means-invisible-hands-ensure-you-never-go-bankrupt] was overcapacity, India’s non-performing assets crisis, the subsequent bargain-basement sale of stranded firms through bankruptcy courts, and the deepening of oligarchy as a few firms bought industry rivals at discounted rates. $India’s defense manufacturing ambitions are tracing a trajectory that is even grimmer. “Eisenhower [Late former US President] had warned against the ‘military-industrial complex’ in 1961, saying that the conjunction of a massive military establishment and a large arms industry posed a threat to democracy and could lead to ‘disastrous rise of misplaced power’,” said former MoD advisor, Cowshish. “We need to be cautious that we do not create the same situation that America created for itself.” India should, he said, have better differentiated responsibilities between the private and public sectors. “The important strategic projects could be with the public sector.” If the product is also intended for civilian use, it may be commercially more viable for the private sector to produce it, he said. $India, however, is sailing into a glut of weapons manufacturers, all drawn to the country’s large weapons procurement budget. $In time, there will be a shakeout. “At this time, the market is evenly poised between OEMs and assemblers,” said Vishal Singh. “In two years, we will see where this goes. Maybe we will be left with ten big companies.” It remains to be seen who prevails — the OEMs with know-how or the assemblers with political capital. It also remains to be seen how firms respond to low orders from the armed forces. $The early signs of the shakeout are already visible. The union leader from the PSU said orders are flowing away from public to private firms. Players with political clout are also squeezing homegrown OEMs out of the race, with some of them focusing more on export markets as a result. The question bears repeating. Is India’s weapons manufacturing push working? Or is it producing “licensed production” that benefits a few firms and countries like Israel, but saddles India with technological dependence (*on a country whose weapons array struggles before cheaper drones*[https://theconversation.com/is-israel-running-low-on-missile-interceptors-how-long-can-it-withstand-irans-retaliatory-attacks-278404])? And what of the privately-owned military-industrial complex that creates local markets for growth, leading to faster militarization of not just state forces but also society? $That morning near Sarh, a woman in a red saree sat by the roadside, slapping cow dung onto a wall for drying. It was a telltale reminder of where much of India’s population stands. The biggest threats to them lie in low social sector spending; abysmal state delivery of education, healthcare, and justice; increasingly compromised institutions; frayed ecological foundations; a kleptocratic polity and an oligarchic economy. $Despite such existential threats and despite the real problems with India’s weapons procurement lying in under-investments in R&D and opaque, discretionary exercises of power during purchases, the NDA appears to have embarked on a non-solution that will only create fresh risks for the country.